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1 Introduction
Decision theory underlies essentially all the social sciences, including economics, finance,
political sciences, psychology, and so on. It is also employed in studying the evolution of
various social systems, where the evolution equations that describe population dynamics
are constructed so as to provide the maximum of utility, or fitness, for the species of the
considered social system.
The predominant theory, describing individual behavior under risk and uncertainty is
nowadays the expected utility theory of preferences over uncertain prospects. This theory,
first introduced by Bernoulli (1738) in his investigation of the St. Petersburg paradox, was
axiomatized by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953), and integrated with the theory of
subjective probability by Savage (1954). The theory was shown to possess great analytical
power by Arrow (1971) and Pratt (1964) in their work on risk aversion and by Rothschild
and Stiglitz (1970, 1971) in their work on comparative risk. Friedman and Savage (1948)
and Markowitz (1952) demonstrated its tremendous flexibility in representing decision mak-
ers attitudes toward risk. It is fair to state that expected utility theory has provided a
solid foundation for the theory of games, the theory of investment and capital markets, the
theory of search, and for other branches of economics, finance, and management (Lindgren,
1971; White, 1976; Hastings and Mello, 1978; Rivett, 1980; Buchanan, 1982; Berger, 1985;
Marshall and Oliver, 1995; Bather, 2000; French and Insua, 2000; Raiffa and Schlaifer, 2000;
Weirich, 2001; Gollier, 2001).
However, a number of economists and psychologists have uncovered a growing body of
evidence showing that individuals do not always conform to prescriptions of expected utility
theory. Moreover, human beings very often depart from the theory in predictable and sys-
tematic way. Actually, the possibility that problems could arise has already been discussed
by Bernoulli (1738) himself. Then, many researchers, starting with the works by Allais
(1953), Edwards (1955, 1962), and Ellsberg (1961), and continuing through the present,
have experimentally confirmed pronounced and systematic deviations from the predictions
of expected utility theory, leading to the appearance of many paradoxes. Neuroscience re-
search suggests that the choice process used by human beings is systematically biased and
suboptimal (Fehr and Rangel, 2011). Among the known paradoxes of classical utility mak-
ing, we can list the Bernoulli St. Petersburg paradox (Bernoulli, 1738), the Allais paradox
(Allais, 1953), the independence paradox (Allais, 1953), the Ellsberg paradox (Ellsberg,
1961), the Kahneman-Tversky paradox (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), the Rabin paradox
(Rabin, 2000), the Ariely paradox (Ariely, 2008), the disjunction effect (Tversky and Shafir,
1992), the conjunction fallacy (Tversky and Kahneman, 1983; Shafir et al., 1990), the isola-
tion effects (McCaffery and Baron, 2006), the combined paradoxes (Yukalov and Sornette,
2009b, 2010b, 2011), the planning paradox (Kydland and Prescott, 1977), and dynamic in-
consistency (Strotz, 1955; Frederick et al., 2002). A large literature on this topic can be
found in the recent reviews (Camerer et al., 2003; Machina, 2008).
All paradoxes, which have been discovered in classical decision making, appear in decision
problems that can be formulated as follows. One considers a set of outcome payoffs X ≡
{xi : i = 1, 2, . . .}, on which a probability measure p : X → [0, 1] is given. Over the payoff
set, there are several lotteries, or prospects, pij = {xi , pj(xi) : i = 1, 2, . . .}, differing by
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the outcome probabilities. The payoff set is the domain of a utility function u(x) that is a
non decreasing concave function. The expected utility of a lottery pij is defined as U(pij) =∑
i u(xi)pj(xi). A lottery pi1 is said to be preferable to pi2 if and only if U(pi1) > U(pi2). And
the lotteries are indifferent, when U(pi1) = U(pi2). Suppose that the given data are such that,
according to the classical decision making, a lottery pi1 is preferable or indifferent to pi2, that
is, U(pi1) ≥ U(pi2), However, decision makers, when deciding between several lotteries under
uncertainty and in the presence of risk, often choose pi2, instead of pi1, thus, contradicting
the prescription of utility theory.
Because of the large number of paradoxes associated with classical decision making,
there have been many attempts to change the expected utility approach, which has been
classified as non-expected utility theories. There exists a number of such non-expected utility
theories, among which we may mention some of the best known: prospect theory (Edwards,
1955; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), weighted-utility theory (Karmarkar, 1978, 1979; Chew,
1983), regret theory (Loomes and Sugden, 1982), optimism-pessimism theory (Hey, 1984),
dual-utility theory (Yaari, 1987), ordinal-independence theory (Green and Jullien, 1988),
and quadratic-probability theory (Chew et al., 1991). More detailed information can be
found in the review by Machina (2008).
However, as has been shown by Safra and Sigal (2008), none of non-expected utility
theories can explain all those paradoxes. The best that could be achieved is a kind of fitting
for interpreting just one or, in the best case, a few paradoxes, while the other paradoxes
remained unexplained. In addition, spoiling the structure of expected utility theory results
in the appearance of complications and inconsistences. As has been concluded in the detailed
analysis of Al-Najjar and Weinstein (2009), any variation of the classical expected utility
theory “ends up creating more paradoxes and inconsistences than it resolves”.
The idea that the functioning of the human brain could be described by the techniques
of quantum theory has been advanced by one of the founders of quantum theory (Bohr,
1933;1958). Von Neumann, who is both a founding father of game theory and of expected
utility theory on the one hand and the developer of the mathematical theory of quantum
mechanics on the other hand, himself mentioned that the quantum theory of measurement
can be interpreted as decision theory (von Neumann, 1955).
The main difference between the classical and quantum techniques is the way of cal-
culating the probability of events. As soon as one accepts the quantum way of defining
the concept of probability, the latter generally becomes non-additive. And one immediately
meets such quantum effects as interference and entanglement. The possibility of employing
the techniques of quantum theory in several branches of sciences, that previously have been
analyzed by classical means, is nowadays widely considered. As examples, we can men-
tion quantum game theory (Eisert and Wilkens, 2000; Landsburg, 2004; Guo et al., 2008),
quantum information processing and quantum computing (Williams and Clearwater, 1998;
Nielsen and Chuang, 2000; Keyl, 2002).
After the works by Bohr (1933, 1958) and von Neumann (1955), there have been a number
of discussions on the possibility of applying quantum rules for characterizing the process of
human decision making (Aerts and Aerts, 1994; Segal and Segal, 1998; Baaquie, 2004,
2009; Busemeyer et al., 2006; Danilov and Lambert-Mogiliansky, 2008, 2010; Bagarello,
2009; Lambert-Mogiliansky et al., 2009; Kitto, 2009; Pothos and Busemeyer, 2010; Leaw
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and Cheong, 2010; West and Grigolini, 2010; Zabaletta and Arizmendi, 2010). Many more
references can be found in the recent review article (Yukalov and Sornette, 2009b). However,
no general theory with quantitative predictive power has been suggested. This was the
motivation for our introduction of a general quantum theory of decision making, based on the
von Neumann theory of quantum measurements (von Neumann, 1955),that can be applied
to any possible situations (Yukalov and Sornette, 2008, 2009a,b,c, 2010a,b, 2011). Our
approach is, to the best of our knowledge, the first theory using the mathematical formulation
of quantum theory that allows for the quantitative treatment of different classical paradoxes
in the frame of a single general scheme. Indeed, practically all paradoxes of classical decision
making find their natural explanation if the frame of the Quantum Decision Theory (QDT)
(Yukalov and Sornette, 2008, 2009a,b,c, 2010a,b, 2011).
As has been stressed above, our framework does not assume that decision makers are
quantum objects. The techniques of quantum theory are employed just as a convenient
mathematical tool. Actually, the sole thing we need is the theory of Hilbert spaces. Generally,
it is worth stressing that the use of quantum techniques requires that neither brain nor
consciousness would have anything to do with genuinely quantum systems. The techniques
of quantum theory are used solely as a convenient mathematical tool and language to capture
the properties associated with decision making. It is known that the description of any
quantum system could be done as if it was a classical system, via the introduction of the
so-called contextual hidden variables. However, their number has to be infinite in order
to capture the same level of elaboration as their quantum equivalent (Dakic et al., 2008),
which makes unpractical the use of a classical equivalent description. Instead, quantum
techniques are employed to describe systems in which interference and entanglement effects
occur, because they are much simpler than to deal with a classical system having an infinite
number of hidden unknown variables. Similarly, we use quantum techniques for decision
theory in order to implicitly take into account the existence of many hidden variables in
humans, such as emotions, subconscious feelings, and various biases. The existence of these
hidden variables strongly influences decision making, as captured partially, for instance,
by the notion of bounded rationality (Simon, 1955) and confirmed by numerous studies
in Behavioral Economics, Behavioral Finance, Attention Economy, and Neuroeconomics
(Cialdini, 2001; Loewenstein et al., 2008).
The standard setup displaying the paradoxes in classical decision making corresponds
to individual decision makers that take decisions without consulting each other. However,
in a number of experimental studies, it has been found that consultation sharply reduces
errors in decision making. For example, Cooper and Kagel (2005) and Blinder and Morgan
(2005) find that groups consistently play more strategically than do individuals and generate
positive synergies in more difficult games. Charness et al. (2007a,b) show that group mem-
bership affects individual choices in strategic games. Charness and Rabin (2002) and Chen
and Li (2009) investigate the minimal-group paradigm and find a substantial increase in
charity concerns and social-welfare-maximizing actions when participants are matched with
in-group members. It was found that the errors in the famous disjunction effect and con-
junction fallacy strongly attenuate when group members get information by learning from
their experience (Ku¨hberger et al., 2001) or exchange information by consulting (Charness
et al., 2010).
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Explaining these attenuation effects, caused by information transfer through the inter-
actions between decision makers, requires extending the theory from isolated individuals to
human beings who are part of a society within which they interact and exchange information.
It is the aim of the present paper to generalize the QDT approach to the case of decision
makers who interact within a group or society. The information received from the society
influences the decisions. This leads to a natural explanation of the error attenuation effect,
as compared with the paradoxes existing for decisions without within-group consultations.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we present the generalization of
QDT for a decision maker who is not a separate individual, but a member of a society. In
Section 3, we show how the additional information, received by the decision maker through
interactions with the surrounding society, leads to the decrease of errors compared with
classical decision making. We discuss the experiment by Charness et al. (2010) and explain
why the initial error in the conjunction fallacy diminishes with the received information.
Section 4 concludes.
2 Social decision makers
Let us consider a society defined as a group of several agents. Each agent is a decision
maker, whose decisions are influenced by other members of the society. A decision maker
aims at choosing between several admissible choices, called lotteries or prospects. As in our
previous papers (Yukalov and Sornette, 2008, 2009a,b,c, 2010a,b, 2011), for each prospect,
we associate a vector in a Hilbert space. But now, in addition to the space of mind for a
given separate decision maker, there exists the decision space of the society as a whole.
2.1 Decision spaces
Let an agent A be a member of a society. Assume that, for this agent, there exists a set of
elementary prospects that are represented by a set of vectors {|n〉}. The elementary-prospect
vectors are orthonormalized, so that the scalar product 〈m|n〉 = δmn is a Kronecker delta.
The orthogonality of the elementary prospects means that they are independent and not
compatible, so that only one of them can be realized. The space of mind of a decision maker
is a closed linear envelope
HA ≡ Span{|n〉} (1)
spanning all admissible elementary prospects. Similarly, such a space of mind can be con-
structed for each member of the society, the states of mind of two distinct individuals being
in general different. Let the space of mind for all members of the society, except the agent A,
be denoted as HB. Then the total decision space of the whole society is the tensor product
HAB ≡ HA
⊗
HB . (2)
This is a Hilbert space, where a scalar product is defined. The spaceHB can also be presented
as a tensor product of the individual spaces of all other society members.
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The elementary prospects serve as a basis for constructing the Hilbert space of mind. But
they are not necessarily the prospects a decision maker is evaluating. They just enumerate
all admissible possibilities.
2.2 Prospect states
The decision maker A considers a set of prospects
L = {pij : j = 1, 2, . . .N} . (3)
Each prospect pij is put into correspondence to a vector |pij〉, called the prospect state, in the
space of mind HA. The prospects of L are, generally, composite objects composed of several
elementary prospects. Many concrete examples are given in the published papers (Yukalov
and Sornette, 2009a,b, 2010b, 2011).
Being an element of the space HA, a prospect state can be represented as an expansion
over the elementary prospects,
| pij 〉 =
∑
n
〈 n | pij 〉 | n 〉 . (4)
The prospect states are not assumed to be either orthogonal or normalized, so that the scalar
product
〈 pii | pij 〉 =
∑
n
〈 pii | n 〉〈 n | pij 〉 (5)
is not a Kronecker delta. The prospects states are not orthogonal with each other, since
they are not necessarily incompatible, but can interfere and entangle with each other. And
the appropriate normalization condition will be imposed later.
The prospects are the targets of the decision maker. The set L of these prospects pij
should be ordered, forming a complete transitive lattice. The ordering procedure will be
given below. The aim of decision making is to find out which of the prospects is the most
favorable.
There can exist two types of setups. One is when a number of agents choose between the
given prospects. Another type is when a single decision maker takes decisions in a repetitive
manner, for instance taking decisions several times. These two cases are treated similarly.
2.3 Prospect operators
To each prospect pij , with a vector state |pij〉 in the Hilbert space of mind HA, there corre-
sponds the prospect operator
Pˆ (pij) ≡ | pij 〉〈 pij | . (6)
By this definition, the prospect operators are self-adjoint. These operators, generally, are
not projectors, as far as they are not necessarily idempotent,
Pˆ 2(pij) = 〈 pij | pij 〉Pˆ (pij) ,
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which follows from the fact that the prospect states, generally, are not normalized. The
prospect operators are not commutative, since the expressions
Pˆ (pii)Pˆ (pij) = 〈 pii | pij 〉| pii 〉〈 pij | , Pˆ (pij)Pˆ (pii) = 〈 pij | pii 〉| pij 〉〈 pii | ,
differing by the order of operators, are not equivalent. The noncommutativity of the prospect
operators represents the noncommutativity of decisions in real life (Yukalov and Sornette,
2009a,b, 2010b, 2011).
The collection {Pˆ (pij)} of the prospect operators is analogous to the algebra of local ob-
servables in quantum theory. In the latter, as is known, not each product of local observables
is, strictly speaking, an observable. But it is always possible to define symmetrized products
so that the collection of local observables would form an algebra. In the same way as for
the operators of local observables in quantum theory, we can consider the family {Pˆ (pij)} of
prospect operators as an algebra of observables in QDT.
2.4 Prospect probabilities
QDT is a probabilistic theory, with the prospect probabilities defined as the averages of the
prospect operators. In that sense, the prospect probabilities play the role of the observable
quantities (Yukalov and Sornette, 2008). In our previous papers, the averages were defined
with respect to a given strategic state |ψ〉 characterizing the decision maker. Such a procedure
corresponds to the averaging over a prescribed pure state, which assumes that the considered
decision maker is an individual, not interacting with any surrounding. But when considering
a decision maker in a society, which he/she interacts with, such a decision maker cannot be
characterized by a pure state.
The society as a whole could be described by a pure wave function, with the decision
maker being a part of the society, which would then lead to the necessity of characterizing this
decision maker by a statistical operator. This is in a direct analogy with treating subsystems
of large systems by density matrices (Coleman and Yukalov, 2000).
Moreover, we could describe the society by a wave function only if we would assume that
the society is completely isolated from its surrounding. But such an assumption is certainly
unreasonable, since there are no absolutely isolated societies. Again, this is completely
equivalent to the absence of absolutely isolated finite quantum systems (Yukalov, 2002,
2003a,b). Thus, the most general way of describing the society state is by a statistical
operator.
In the present case, the society state, including the considered decision maker, is to be
characterized by a statistical operator ρˆAB that is a positive operator on HAB, normalized
as
TrAB ρˆAB = 1 , (7)
with the trace operation being performed over HAB. The observable quantities are to be
defined by the expectation values over the statistical operator. Therefore the prospect prob-
abilities are given by the averages
p(pij) ≡ TrAB ρˆABPˆ (pij) . (8)
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The prospect operators act on the space of mind HA of the decision maker. Hence the
above average can be represented as
p(pij) ≡ TrAρˆAPˆ (pij) , (9)
where the trace is over HA and the reduced statistical operator is
ρˆA ≡ TrB ρˆAB . (10)
This operator characterizes the decision maker in the society. The reduction to the previous
situation of a single separated decision maker, as considered in our previous papers, would
correspond to the representation of the statistical operator ρˆA in the pure form |ψ〉〈ψ|, with
the state |ψ〉 being the decision maker strategic state. But, generally, the statistical operator
ρˆA cannot be represented in such a factor form, since the decision maker state is entangled
with that of the society.
Introducing the matrix elements over the elementary-prospect basis for the statistical
operator
ρmn ≡ 〈 m | ρˆA | n 〉 (11)
and for the prospect operators
Pmn(pij) ≡ 〈 m | Pˆ (pij) | n 〉 = 〈 m | pij 〉〈 pij | n 〉 (12)
makes it possible to rewrite the prospect probabilities as
p(pij) =
∑
mn
ρmnPnm(pij) . (13)
To really represent probabilities, the above quantities are to be normalized so that
N∑
j=1
p(pij) = 1 . (14)
Since the statistical operator, by definition, is a positive operator, we have
0 ≤ p(pij) ≤ 1 . (15)
This defines the collection {p(pij)} as a probability measure. The most favorable prospect
corresponds to the largest of the probabilities.
Let us introduce the utility factor
f(pij) ≡
∑
n
ρnnPnn(pij) (16)
and the attraction factor
q(pij) ≡
∑
m6=n
ρmnPnm(pij) , (17)
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whose meanings will be explained below. Then, separating the diagonal and non-diagonal
terms in the sum over m and n, we obtain the probability of a prospect pij as the sum
p(pij) = f(pij) + q(pij) (18)
of the above two factors.
Though some intermediate steps of the theory might look a bit complicated, the final
result is rather simple and can be straightforwardly used in practice, provided the way of
evaluating the utility and attraction factors are known.
2.5 Utility factors
As is known (Neumann, 1955), the expectation values of observables in quantum theory
can be separated in two terms, one having a diagonal representation over the chosen basis
and another being off-diagonal in this representation. The diagonal part corresponds to the
classical value of the observable, while the off-diagonal part characterizes purely quantum
effects caused by interference. The same holds in our case, where the prospect probability
(8) is defined as the expectation value of the prospect operator. The diagonal part is the
utility factor (16) describing the weight of the prospect calculated classically. To be defined
as a weight, the set of these factors is to be normalized as
N∑
j=1
f(pij) = 1 , (19)
from where one has
0 ≤ f(pij) ≤ 1 , (20)
since, by definition (16), the factor is non-negative.
In classical decision theory, the choice of a decision maker is based on the notion of
expected utility. One considers a set of measurable payoffs {xi} associated with the related
probabilities pj(xi) whose family forms a probability measure with the standard properties∑
i
pj(xi) = 1 , 0 ≤ pj(xi) ≤ 1 .
A prospect pij is represented by a lottery
pij ≡ {xi , pj(xi) : i = 1, 2, . . .} . (21)
Linear combinations of lotteries are defined as
∑
j
λjpij =
{
xi ,
∑
j
λjpj(xi)
}
,
with the constants λj such that∑
j
λj = 1 , 0 ≤ λj ≤ 1 .
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Introducing a utility function u(x), which is defined as a non-decreasing concave and
positive function, one constructs the expected utility
U(pij) =
∑
i
u(xi)pj(xi) . (22)
The utility factor is nothing but the expected utility reduced so as to satisfy the normalization
condition (19), which gives
f(pij) =
U(pij)∑
j U(pij)
. (23)
The same expression for the utility factor can be derived by maximizing the Shannon
information under the given expected likelihood (Yukalov and Sornette, 2009b).
2.6 Attraction factors
The off-diagonal term in the expectation value (9) is the attraction factor (17) representing
quantum interference, or coherence, effects. In QDT, the attraction factor is a contextual
object describing subconscious feelings, emotions, and biases, playing the role of hidden
variables. Despite their contextuality, the attraction factors satisfy some general properties
that make possible their quantitative evaluation.
In view of normalizations (14) and (19), the attraction factors satisfy the alternation
property, such that the sum
N∑
j=1
q(pij) = 0 (24)
over the prospect lattice L is always zero, and the values of the attraction factor are in the
range
− 1 ≤ q(pij) ≤ 1 . (25)
In addition, the average absolute value of the attraction factor is estimated (Yukalov and
Sornette, 2009b, 2011) by the quarter law
1
N
N∑
j=1
| q(pij) | = 1
4
. (26)
These properties allow us to quantitatively define the prospect probabilities (18).
We may note that the attraction factor exists only for composite prospects, composed
of several actions, while for elementary prospects this term is zero. This is easy to show as
follows. Let ej be an elementary prospect corresponding to a state |j〉, hence 〈n|j〉 = δnj.
The related prospect operator Pˆ (ej) is defined in Eq. (6). Then the prospect probability
(13) reduces to
p(ej) =
∑
mn
ρmnδmjδnj = ρjj ,
and the attraction factor is zero:
q(ej) = 0 .
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In this way, there exists a direct general relation between Quantum Decision Theory and
classical decision theory, based on the maximization of expected utility. Classical decision
theory is retrieved when the attraction factor is zero. The form of the utility factor (23)
shows that, in this situation, maximizing the expected utility is equivalent to maximizing the
utility factor. Thus, classical decision theory is a particular case of the more general QDT in
the case when only objective information on the decision utility is taken into account, while
subjective sides, such as biases, emotions, and subconscious feelings play no role. The latter
variables do play a very important role in decision making performed in many important and
practical situations. Our approach takes into account both the objective utility of considered
prospects as well as their subjective attractiveness for the decision maker.
Let us briefly summarize. As we said, the attraction factor in QDT appears naturally in
order to account for subconscious feelings, emotions, and biases. Despite the fact that the
attraction factor is contextual, it satisfies three pivotal general properties: (i) an attraction
factor varies in the interval [−1, 1]; (ii) the sum of all attraction factors over the lattice of
considered prospects is zero; (iii) the average absolute value of an attraction factor is 0.25.
These properties make it possible to give a quantitative evaluation of prospect probabilities
and, thus, to develop a practical way of applying QDT to realistic problems of decision
making.
2.7 Prospect ordering
Since the prospect probability (18) consists of two terms, we should consider both of them,
when comparing the probabilities of different prospects. That is, we have to compare the
usefulness as well as attractiveness of the prospects.
The usefulness of prospects is measured by the utility factor. The prospect pi1 is more
useful than pi2, when
f(pi1) > f(pi2) . (27)
The prospects pi1 and pi2 are equally useful, if
f(pi1) = f(pi2) . (28)
And the prospect pi1 is not less useful (more useful or equally useful) than pi2, if
f(pi1) ≥ f(pi2) . (29)
The attractiveness of prospects is characterized by their attraction factors. The prospect
pi1 is more attractive than pi2, if
q(pi1) > q(pi2) . (30)
The prospects pi1 and pi2 are equally attractive, when
q(pi1) = q(pi2) . (31)
And the prospect pi1 is not less attractive (more attractive or equally attractive) than pi2,
when
q(pi1) ≥ q(pi2) . (32)
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The comparison between the attractiveness of prospects can be done on the basis of
the aversion to uncertainty and risk or ambiguity aversion (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1970;
Gollier, 2001; Sornette, 2003; Malvergne and Sornette, 2006; Abdellaoui et al., 2011a; 2011b;
Yukalov and Sornette, 2011).
A prospect is more attractive when:
• (i) it provides more certain gain (more uncertain loss).
• (ii) it promotes to be active under certainty (passive under uncertainty).
The total evaluation of prospects that finally influences the decision maker choice is based
on the prospect probabilities. The prospect pi1 is preferable to pi2, if
p(pi1) > p(pi2) . (33)
The prospects pi1 and pi2 are indifferent, when
p(pi1) = p(pi2) . (34)
And the prospect pi1 is preferable or indifferent to pi2, if
p(pi1) ≥ p(pi2) . (35)
The classification of prospects of a set L as more or less preferable establishes an order
in L making this ordered set a lattice. Among all prospects, there exists the least preferable
prospect with the minimal probability, and the most preferable prospect with the largest
probability. Hence, the prospect lattice L is complete. The lattice is also transitive since, if
pi1 is preferable to pi2, with pi2 being preferable to pi3, then pi1 is preferable to pi3.
Decision makers choose the most preferable prospect, whose probability is the largest.
Such a prospect is called optimal. The prospect pi∗ is optimal if and only if
p(pi∗) = max
j
p(pij) . (36)
In the presence of two criteria characterizing each prospect, a given prospect can be
more useful, while being less attractive, or vice-versa. As a consequence, there are situations
where the ordering of classical utility theory is inverted, so that the less useful though more
attractive prospect is preferred, having the largest probability. This important fact can be
formalized by the following statement.
Proposition 1. The prospect pi1 is preferable to pi2 if and only if
f(pi1)− f(pi2) > q(pi2)− q(pi1) . (37)
Proof: It follows from the comparison of the prospect probabilities (18) for pi1 and pi2.
This inequality provides an explanation for the appearance of paradoxes in classical de-
cision making as resulting from the role of the attraction factor representing the interference
between prospects. It is remarkable that this simple idea seems to be sufficient to remove
the empirical paradoxes and make QDT consistent with the decisions made by real human
beings. The existence of the attraction factor is due to the presence of risk and uncertainty
associated with the choices to be made.
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2.8 Binary lattice
A situation that is very often considered in empirical research consists in choosing between
two prospects, which corresponds to a binary lattice
L = {pi1 , pi2} . (38)
This case is sufficient to clearly illustrate the above general considerations.
For a binary lattice, we have
p(pi1) = f(pi1) + q(pi1) , p(pi2) = f(pi2) + q(pi2) . (39)
The normalization (19) reads as
f(pi1) + f(pi2) = 1 , (40)
and the alternation property (24) becomes
q(pi1) + q(pi2) = 0 . (41)
If the considered two prospects are equally attractive, which implies q(pi1) = q(pi2), then,
according to (41), we get q(pi1) = q(pi2) = 0. Therefore, the prospect probabilities coincide
with their utility factors, p(pi1) = f(pi1) and p(pi2) = f(pi2). In such a situation, we return to
the standard decision making recipe based on the comparison between the prospect utilities.
But when the prospects are not equally attractive, say pi1 is more attractive than pi2, that
is, q(pi1) > q(pi2), then the alternation property (41) yields
q(pi1) = −q(pi2) > 0 .
This allows one to make accurate predictions of the choice of real human being who have to
choose an optimal prospect.
2.9 Individual decisions
Suppose that a decision maker has to choose between several prospects. Let he/she be
assumed to make a decision sufficiently quickly, with no consultations with other members of
society, and without getting additional information from other sources. This kind of decision
making can be termed individual. Such a setup is typical of the majority of experimental
observations, where different paradoxes have been documented.
In the case of this spontaneous decision making, it is possible to quantitatively predict
typical decisions and, respectively, to explain the occurrence of characteristic paradoxes. This
can be done as follows. Let us consider a binary lattice of prospects. Assume that, according
to the risk-uncertainty aversion formulated above, the prospect pi1 is more attractive than
pi2, hence
q(pi1) > q(pi2) .
13
It is possible to estimate the attraction factors by their mean values, as explained above,
evaluating q(pi1) as equal to 1/4 and q(pi2) as given by −1/4. At the same time, the proba-
bility belongs to the interval [0, 1]. To take this into account, it is convenient to invoke the
function, called retract, such that
Ret[a,b]{z} =


a , z ≤ a
z , a < z < b
b , z ≥ b
.
Then the prospect probabilities (39) can be represented as
p(pi1) = Ret[0,1]
{
f(pi1) +
1
4
}
, p(pi2) = Ret[0,1]
{
f(pi2)− 1
4
}
. (42)
Since, the utility factors are calculated by means of formula (23), one gets a quantitative
estimate for the prospect probabilities, which makes it possible to choose the preferable
prospect.
Proposition 2. Let the prospect pi1 from a binary prospect lattice be more attractive than
pi2 and let the prospect probabilities be evaluated by expressions (42), then pi1 is preferable
over pi2 when the utility factor of pi1 is such that
f(pi1) >
1
4
(pi1 > pi2) . (43)
Respectively, the prospects are indifferent, if f(pi1) = 1/4 and the prospect pi2 is preferable,
if f(pi1) < 1/4.
Proof: It follows from expressions (42) and the condition that the prospect pi1 is more
attractive than pi2, so that q(pi1) > q(pi2).
2.10 Comparison with experiment
Strictly speaking, being defined to reflect subjective factors embodying subconscious feelings,
emotions, and biases, the attraction factors are contextual. This means that their values
can be different for different decision makers. Moreover, they can be different for the same
decision maker at different times. These features seem to be natural when one keeps in mind
that we are describing real humans, whose decisions are usually different, even under identical
conditions. It is also known that the same decision maker can vary his/her decisions at
different times and under different circumstances. However, focusing solely on the contextual
character of the interference terms, gives the wrong impression of a lack of predictive power
of the approach, which would make it rather meaningless.
Fortunately, there is a way around the problem of contextuality, based on the fact that
QDT has been constructed as a probabilistic theory, with the probabilities interpreted in the
frequentist sense. This is equivalent to saying that QDT is a theory of the aggregate behavior
of a population. In other words, the predictions of the theory are statistical statements
concerning the population of individualistic behaviors, namely, QDT provides the probability
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for a given individual to take this or that decision, interpreted in the sense of the fraction of
individuals taking these decisions.
The prospect probabilities, calculated in the frame of QDT, can be compared with the
results of experimental tests. In experiments, one usually interrogates a pool of M decision
makers, asking them to choose a prospect from the given prospect set {pij}. Different de-
cision makers, of course, can classify as optimal different prospects. Since the utility factor
is an objective quantity, we assume that it is the same for all decision makers. The dif-
ference between the decisions of the pool members happens because the attraction factors,
being subjective quantities, can be different for different decision makers. Here, we thus do
not need to invoke random utilities and heterogeneous expectations in the objective utility
factor (Cohen, 1980; McFadden and Richter, 1991; Clark, 1995; Regenwetter, 2001). The
heterogeneity or differences between different decision makers appear due to the presence of
the attraction factor that embodies different states of minds among the human population,
and as a function of context and time.
The experimental probability that a prospect pij is chosen can be defined as a frequency
in the following way. Let Mj agents from the total number M of decision makers choose
the prospect pij . Then, assuming a large number of agents, the aggregate probability of this
prospect is given by the frequency
pexp(pij) =
Mj
M
. (44)
This experimental probability is to be compared with the theoretical prospect probability
p(pij), using the standard tools of statistical hypothesis testing.
It is also possible to define the aggregate value of the attraction factor by the equation
q(pij) = pexp(pij)− f(pij) (45)
and to compare this with the mean values ±1/4.
In this way, QDT provides a practical scheme that can be applied to realistic problems
for various kinds of decision making in psychology, economics, and finance.
As an illustration, we have applied this theory to several examples in which the disjunc-
tion effect occurs. The latter is specified by Savage (1954) as a violation of the sure-thing
principle. A typical setup for illustrating the disjunction effect is a two-step gamble (Tversky
and Shafir, 1992). Suppose that a group of people accepted a gamble in which the player can
either win an amount of money or lose a possibly different amount. After the first gamble,
the participants are invited to gamble a second time, being free to either accept the second
gamble or to refuse it. Experiments by Tversky and Shafir (1992) showed that the majority
of people accept the second gamble when they know the result of the first gamble, whatever
its result, whether they won or lost in the previous gamble, but only a minority accepted
the second gamble when the outcome of the first gamble was unknown to them.
Another example, studied by Tversky and Shafir (1992), had to do with a group of
students who reported their preferences about buying a nonrefundable vacation, following a
tough university test. They could pass the exam or fail. The students had to decide whether
they would go on vacation or abstain. It turned out that the majority of students purchased
the vacation when they passed the exam as well as when they had failed. However, only a
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minority of participants purchased the vacation when they did not know the results of the
examination.
Another example of the disjunction effect concerns stock markets, as analyzed by Shafir
and Tversky (1992). Consider the USA presidential election, when either a Republican or
a Democrat wins. On the eve of the election, market players can either sell certain stocks
from their portfolio or hold them. It is known that a majority of people would be inclined
to sell their stocks, if they would know who wins, regardless of whether the Republican or
Democrat candidate wins the upcoming election. This is because people expect the market to
fall after the elections. At the same time, a great many people do not sell their stocks before
knowing who really won the election, thus contradicting the sure-thing principle. Thus,
investors could have sold their stocks before the election at a higher price, but, abiding to
the disjunction effect, they were waiting until after the election to know its result, thereby
selling sub-optimally at a lower price after stocks have already fallen.
We have presented a detailed analysis of the above experiments (Yukalov and Sornette,
2009b; 2011). The absolute value of the aggregate attraction factor (45) was found, within
the typical statistical error of the order of 20% characterizing these experiments, to coincide
with the predicted value 0.25.
Another known paradox in classical decision making is the conjunction error. A typical
situation is when people judge about a person, who can possess one characteristic and also
some other characteristics, as in the often-cited example of Tversky and Kahneman (1980):
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a
student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice, and also
participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations. Which is more likely? (i) Linda is a bank teller;
(ii) Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement. Most people answer (ii)
which is an example of the conjunction fallacy.
There are many other examples of the conjunction fallacy. For a quantitative analysis,
we have taken the data from Shafir et al. (1990), who present one of the most carefully
accomplished and thoroughly discussed set of experiments on the conjunction fallacy. Again,
we found (Yukalov and Sornette, 2009b; 2011) that the value of the aggregate attraction
factor, within the experimental accuracy of 20%, coincides with 0.25, in excellent agreement
with the QDT quarter law.
The planning paradox has also found a natural explanation within QDT (Yukalov and
Sornette, 2009a). Moreover, it has been shown (Yukalov and Sornette, 2010b) that QDT
explains practically all typical paradoxes of classical decision making, arising when decisions
are taken by separate individuals.
3 Influence of social interactions
The standard setup displaying the paradoxes in classical decision making corresponds to
individual decision makers that take decisions without consulting each other. As has been
mentioned in the Introduction, in a number of experimental studies, it has been found that
exchange of information through consultations sharply reduces errors in decision making
compared with the prescription of classical utility theory. For instance, the errors in the
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disjunction effect and conjunction fallacy strongly decrease, when group members get infor-
mation by learning from their experience (Ku¨hberger et al., 2001) or exchange information
by consulting (Charness et al., 2010).
The theory developed in the previous sections has been formulated for a decision maker
that is a member of a society. An individual decision maker is just a particular instance for
the application of the theory. The suggested general approach can also be applied to the case
of a decision maker interacting with other members of the society and receiving information
from them, which may change his/her preferences and decrease the errors typical of individual
decision makers. A decision maker, receiving information from the surrounding members of
his/her society, can be called a learning decision maker.
3.1 Learning decision maker
Let us denote by τ a measurable amount of information received by a decision maker from
the surrounding society. The amount of information can be measured by invoking some
of the known information measures (Khinchin, 1957; Arndt, 2004). The information can
be received through direct interactions, that is, consultations with other members of the
society. Or each member of the society can receive information by learning the results of
other agents activity. For instance, the aggregate trades of agents in a market produce
the data characterizing this market that is then available to all and mediates the indirect
interactions between them. Learning these data gives information to each of the traders
(Barber et al., 2009).
If each member of the society gets the amount of information τ , the state of each member
changes, hence the state of the society also varies depending on the amount of the exchanged
information. The statistical operator, characterizing the society state, is now a function
ρˆAB(τ), which is normalized as
TrABρˆAB(τ) = 1 . (46)
We then follow a procedure similar to that described in Section 2. The prospect probability
is defined as before by
p(pij , τ) ≡ TrAB ρˆAB(τ)Pˆ (pij) , (47)
with the difference that we have now an additional variable τ . By convention, if the latter
is set to zero, we return to the same formulas as those presented in Section 2. Since the
prospect operators act on the space of mind HA, by defining the reduced statistical operator
ρˆA(τ) ≡ TrB ρˆAB(τ) , (48)
the prospect probability takes the form
p(pij, τ) ≡ TrAρˆA(τ)Pˆ (pij) . (49)
And in the matrix representation, we get
p(pij, τ) =
∑
mn
ρmn(τ)Pnm(pij) , (50)
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with the notation
ρmn(τ) ≡ 〈 m| ρˆA(τ) |n 〉 (51)
and the normalization condition
TrAρˆA(τ) =
∑
n
ρnn(τ) = 1 . (52)
Let us introduce the evolution operator Uˆ(τ) that describes the evolution of the system
state under the varying amount of the exchanged information τ . The initial state, before
the information exchange starts, is
ρˆAB(0) = ρˆAB , (53)
and corresponds to the situation when decision makers were still separate non-interacting
individuals.
The transformation resulting from the interactions between decision makers can be rep-
resented as
ρˆAB(τ) = Uˆ(τ)ρˆABUˆ
+(τ) . (54)
To satisfy the initial condition (53), it is necessary that the initial value of the evolution
operator Uˆ(0) be the identity operator 1ˆAB acting on HAB:
Uˆ(0) = 1ˆAB . (55)
In order for the normalization condition (46) to be valid for all τ , the evolution operator has
to be unitary such that
Uˆ+(τ)Uˆ(τ) = 1ˆAB . (56)
Assuming that Uˆ(τ) is continuous with respect to τ , differentiating condition (56), applying
the operator Uˆ(τ) and using again (56) gives
dUˆ(τ)
dτ
+ Uˆ(τ)
dUˆ+(τ)
dτ
Uˆ(τ) = 0 . (57)
This equation for a unitary operator Uˆ(τ) can be rewritten as
i
dUˆ(τ)
dτ
= HˆABUˆ(τ) , (58)
where HAB is called the evolution generator, which is a self-adjoint operator onHAB assumed
to be invariant with respect to τ . Equation (58) yields the evolution operator
Uˆ(τ) = exp
(
−iHˆABτ
)
. (59)
This evolution operator, in view of Eq. (54), defines the variation of the total state of the
society under the varying amount of information τ .
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3.2 Decision maker as an individual personality
The interaction of the decision maker with her social environment is supposed to ensure that
she keeps her distinct identity and personality while, at the same time, possibly changing
her state of mind. In other words, the surrounding society does influence the decision maker
state, but does so in a way that does not suppress her as a person taking her own decisions.
In modeling terms, this corresponds to the behavior of a subsystem that is part of a larger
system that changes the subsystem properties, while the subsystem is not destroyed and
retains its typical features. Such a subsystem is called quasi-isolated (Yukalov, 2011, 2012a).
Another correspondence is the influence exerted on a finite system by an external measuring
device that acts so as not to destroy the main system features, a situation referred to as
nondestructive measurements (Yukalov, 2012b). In mathematical language, these properties
are formulated as follows.
Reflecting the fact that the total system that is considered consists of the decision maker,
her surrounding society, and their mutual interactions, the evolution generator HˆAB is rep-
resented as a sum of the corresponding three terms
HˆAB = HˆA + HˆB + Hˆint . (60)
The first term characterizes the decision maker, which implies that the operator HˆA generates
the space of mind HA by defining the basis of elementary prospects that are typical of the
decision maker, through the eigenvalue problem
HˆA | n 〉 = En | n 〉 , (61)
with the span over the basis yielding the space of mind (1). The second term, acting on
the space HB, describes the surrounding society. And the third term, acting on the total
space HAB, corresponds to the interaction of the decision maker with her social environment,
associated with the process of information exchange.
As mentioned above, the interaction of the decision maker with her social environment
is supposed to ensure that the decision maker keeps her identity and personality, although
possibly changing her state of mind. In mathematical language, this is formulated as the
following commutativity property [
HˆA, Hˆint
]
= 0 . (62)
The latter, in combination with (60), is equivalent to the commutativity condition[
HˆA, HˆAB
]
= 0 . (63)
Actually, these general properties are sufficient for characterizing the decision maker as a
distinct personality, and more detailed structure of the generators is not important.
Let the space HB be generated by the generator HˆB through the span over the basis
formed by the eigenvectors given by the eigenproblem
HˆB | k 〉 = Bk | k 〉 . (64)
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In view of Eq. (62), there is a set of real numbers {βnk} such that the interaction term
satisfies the equation
Hˆint | nk 〉 = βnk | nk 〉 , (65)
in which |nk〉 ≡ |n〉⊗|k〉 denotes the tensorial product between the eigenvectors |n〉 and |k〉.
Then, the generator of the total system yields the eigenproblem
HˆAB | nk 〉 = (En +Bk + βnk) | nk 〉 . (66)
The above equations make it straightforward to derive the explicit expression for the
prospect probability (50). For this purpose, let us introduce some convenient notations. We
define the eigenvalue differences
ωmn = Em − En , εmnk ≡ βmk − βnk (67)
and the matrix elements
ρmn(τ) = ρmn(0) exp(−iωmnτ) , (68)
in which
ρmn(0) = 〈 m | ρˆA | n 〉 = ρmn .
We introduce the effect density describing the distribution of the impacts of the surround-
ing environment affecting the considered decision maker during the process characterizing
the transfer of information:
gmn(ε) ≡
∑
k
〈 mk | ρˆAB | nk 〉
〈 m | ρˆA | n 〉 δ(ε− εmnk) . (69)
It is clear that the latter is normalized as∫ +∞
−∞
gmn(ε) dε = 1 . (70)
The Fourier transform of the effect density gives the decoherence factor
Dmn(τ) ≡
∫ +∞
−∞
gmn(ε)e
−iετ dε . (71)
Finally, we come to the prospect probability (50) represented as
p(pij , τ) = f(pij) + q(pij , τ) . (72)
Here, the first term is the same utility factor as in Eq. (16). It does not depend on the
received additional information, being assumed to be an objective invariant quantity. And
the second term is the attraction factor as a function of the received information
q(pij, τ) =
∑
m6=n
ρmn(τ)Pnm(pij)Dmn(τ) . (73)
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Generally, the decoherence factor can depend on the indices m,n. For simplicity, it is
possible, resorting to the theorem of average, to employ an averaged decoherence factor not
depending on the indices, which reduces the attraction factor (73) to the form
q(pij , τ) = q(pij , τ)D(τ) ,
where
q(pij , τ) ≡
∑
m6=n
ρmn(τ)Pnm(τ) .
Since the effect density is normalized as in Eq. (70), the decoherence factor D(τ) derived
from the above use of the theorem of average with (71) enjoys the property D(0) = 1.
Therefore, at zero information, the attraction factor
q(pij , 0) = q(pij) (74)
has the properties described in Section 2.6, and we return to the initial prospect probability
p(pij , 0) = p(pij) , (75)
defined by Eq. (18).
Thus, we see that the absolute value of the attraction factor essentially depends on the
value of the decoherence factors (71).
3.3 Attraction factor attenuation
If the surrounding society does not influence the decision maker, the effect density is given
by the delta function δ(ε). Then, the decoherence factor is constant: D(τ) = 1. That is, we
always have the same expression of the prospect probability as in Eq. (18), which is quite
clear, since getting no additional information does not change the preferences of the decision
maker.
The nontrivial situation is when the decision maker consults with other members of the
society, acquiring additional information. Interactions of the decision maker with the society
can be of different types, which defines particular forms of the effect density.
If the number of the members in the society is large, and they act on the decision maker
independently, then, by the central limit theorem, the effect density can be modeled by a
Gaussian
g(ε) =
1√
2pi γ
exp
(
− ε
2
γ2
)
, (76)
where γ is the variance of the impacts from different members of the society. Respectively,
the decoherence factor (71) is also a Gaussian
D(τ) = exp
(
− τ
2
2τ 2c
) (
τc ≡ 1
γ
)
, (77)
diminishing with the increasing amount of information. Thence, the attraction factor (73) de-
creases with increasing τ , which implies the decrease of deviations from the classical decision
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making and the attenuation of the related paradoxes, as has been observed in experiments
with social groups (Charness et al., 2010). The characteristic decoherence time τc is shorter
for larger variance of the impacts, when there are many society members with different
properties.
When the number of the society members is not large, the effect density can differ from
the Gaussian form. For example, it can be given by the Lorentz distribution
g(ε) =
γ
pi(ε2 + γ2)
. (78)
As a result, the decoherence factor is exponential:
D(τ) = exp(−γτ) . (79)
If the effect density is represented by the Poisson distribution
g(ε) =
1
2γ
exp
(
− |ε|
γ
)
, (80)
the decoherence factor is of the power law form:
D(τ) =
1
1 + (γτ)2
. (81)
When the society influence is described by a uniform distribution on the bounded interval
[−γ,+γ],
g(ε) =
1
2γ
Θ(γ − ε)Θ(γ + ε) , (82)
where Θ(·) is a unit-step function, then the decoherence factor decays with oscillations as
D(τ) =
sin(γτ)
γτ
. (83)
These examples can be generalized by showing that, typically, the decoherence factor
asymptotically diminishes with increasing information, which leads to a decreasing attraction
factor and a convergence of the prospect probability to the classical form characterized by
the utility factor. This is summarized by the following theorem.
Proposition 3. Let the effect density g(ε) be a measurable function. Then, the prospect
probability p(pij , τ), under asymptotically large amount of information τ , tends to the classical
form represented by the utility factor f(pij):
lim
τ→∞
p(pij , τ) = f(pij) . (84)
Proof: Suppose the effect density g(ε) is measurable, hence being not of the delta-function
type. By definition (70), it is L1-integrable. Therefore, by the Riemann-Lebesgue lemma
(Bochner and Chandrasekharan, 1949), the decoherence factor (71) tends to zero for asymp-
totically large τ :
lim
τ→∞
D(τ) = 0 . (85)
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Consequently, because of relation (73), the attraction factor also tends to zero:
lim
τ→∞
q(pij, τ) = 0 . (86)
Then, from Eq. (72) it follows that the prospect probability reduces to the classical utility
factor, as is stated in Eq. (84).
3.4 Conjunction fallacy disappearance
Charness et al. (2010) accomplished a series of experiments designed to test whether and
to what extent individuals succumb to the conjunction fallacy. They used an experimental
design of Tversky and Kahneman (1983) and found that, when subjects are allowed to consult
with other subjects, the proportions of individuals who violate the conjunction principle fall
dramatically, particularly when the size of the group rises. It has also been found that
financial incentives for providing the correct answer are effective in inducing individuals to
make efforts to find the correct answer. When individuals are forced to think, they recover
in their minds additional information that has been forgotten or shadowed by emotions. The
amount of received information increases with the size of the group. As a result, there is a
substantially larger drop in the error rate when the group size is increased from two to three
than when it is increased from one to two (Charness et al., 2007a; 2010). These findings
confirm the earlier studies by Sutter (2005), who finds only a marginal difference between
the choices of individuals and two-person groups, but a significant difference between the
choices of two-person and four-person groups in an experimental guessing game. In any
event, the effects of group interaction are not proportional to group size. In other words, the
error attenuation decays faster than the inverse information, which is compatible with the
decoherence factors of the Gaussian (71) or exponential (73) forms. In order to determine
the exact form of the error attenuation, it would be necessary to perform a number of
experiments in which the group size or the amount of received information would be varied
over significant larger intervals than done until now.
In the experiment by Charness et al. (2010), with groups of three members, the fraction
of individuals giving incorrect answers dropped to 0.17. It would be interesting to study
how the errors would diminish with further increase of the number of the consulting decision
makers. It is clear that the error should not disappear completely, since the amount of
received information is never actually infinite. However, there exists a critical amount of
information, when the error could be neglected. This critical value would also be interesting
to find experimentally.
4 Conclusion
We have generalized the quantum decision theory (QDT), developed earlier for individual de-
cision makers (Yukalov and Sornette, 2008, 2009a,b,c, 2010a,b, 2011), to the case of decision
makers that are members of a society, in which agents interact with each other by exchang-
ing information. Mathematically, this corresponds to replacing the description of strategic
states of decision makers from wave functions to statistical operators. In QDT, a choice is
23
made by choosing the prospect that corresponds to the largest probability, each prospect
probability consisting of two terms, a utility factor and an attraction factor. The utility
factor characterizes the objective utility of prospects, while the attraction factor represents
subjective feelings, emotions, and biases. Setting the attraction factor to zero reduces QDT
to the classical decision making based on the maximization of expected utility. So, classical
decision theory is a particular case of QDT. Without taking account of the attraction factor,
classical decision makers depart from the predictions of classical utility theory, leading to a
variety of paradoxes. But in QDT, all those paradoxes find simple and natural explanations,
since the theory accounts for the decisions of real human beings.
At an initial stage, when the decision makers of a given society have not had yet sufficient
time for mutual interactions to increase their information, the attraction factor, quantifying
the deviations from classical decision theory, is crucially important. Its aggregate absolute
value is about 0.25 on a maximum scale of 0 to 1 for the choice probabilities. It is therefore
highly significant. The occurrence of the attraction factor is due to the interference of
prospects in the decision maker brains. Since, in quantum theory, interference is necessarily
connected with coherence, it is possible to say that the decision maker is in a coherent state.
However, the level of this coherence, and the value of the attraction factor, essentially
depends on the amount of information available to a decision maker. If, in the process
of mutual interactions between the members of the society, the amount of information of
a decision maker increases, then the attraction factor diminishes. This can be called the
decoherence process. Respectively, the prospect probabilities tend to their classical values
represented by the utility factors. This rationalizes experimental findings showing that
the deviations from classical decision making decrease when agents make decisions after
consulting with each other (Charness et al., 2010).
It is possible to imagine a situation where a decision maker receives wrong, that is
negative, information from the society members, for instance when cheating on this particular
individual. In that case, the attraction factor should increase, hence, the deviations from
classical decision making should rise. It would be interesting to perform such experiments
with decision makers getting wrong or misleading information to calibrate better the effect
density functions that are central to QDT for interacting individuals.
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